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USING THE INNOCENT TO SCAPEGOAT
M!RANDA: ANOTHER REPLY
TO PAUL CASSELL*
RICHARD A. LEO AND RICHIARD J. OFS**"
I. INTRODUCTION
In Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost Confes-
sions-And From Miranda,1 Paul Cassell advances several logically
flawed and empirically erroneous propositions. These proposi-
tions appear to stem from Cassell's ideological commitments,
2
and they continue his seemingly empirical and virtually single-
handed assault' on the Warren Court's ruling in Miranda v. Ari-
• We thank Charles Weisselberg and Welsh White for their helpful comments. We
also thank Paul Cassell for graciously providing pre-publication copies of various
drafts of his article.
.Assistant Professor of Criminology, Law and Society, University of California, Ir-
vine; Assistant Professor of Sociology and Adjoint Professor of Law, University of
Colorado, Boulder;, Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley; J.D., University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley.
... Professor of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley; Ph.D., Stanford Uni-
versity.
Paul Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost Confessions-And
From Miranda, 88J. CRIM. L. & CR~IINOLOGY 497 (1998).
' Others have likewise criticized Cassell for the ideological nature of his scholar-
ship. See, e.g., Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, The Myth of Infallibility: A Re-
ply to Markman and Cassell, 41 STAN. L REV. 161, 169 (1988) (observing that Markman
and Cassell's "efforts appear to spring largely from unacknowledged political roots.");
see also Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda and Clearance Rates, 91 Nw. U. L REv. 278,
278-79 (1996) ("Yet once again, [Cassell's] arguments rest on selective descriptions of
the data and-I am sorry to say-indefensibly partisan characterizations of the under-
lying material."); George C. Thomas, III, Telling Half Truths, LEGAL TIMEs, Aug. 12,
1996, at 20 ("While Miranda is not immune from questioning, advocacy cannot re-
place careful scholarship"); id. at 24 ("[S]cholars have a duty to describe all the evi-
dence and to acknowledge contrary interpretations if they are widely held. Professor
Cassell draws a one-sided picture of the evidence against Miranda.").
3 See generally Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Falling Clearance Rates After Miranda:
Coincidence or Consequences, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1181 (1998); Paul G. Cassell & Richard
Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops?: A Thirty Year Perspective on Miranda's Harmful Effects on
Law Enforcement 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (1998); Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's "Negligible"
Effect on Law Enforcement: Some Skeptical Observations, 20 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POLy 327
(1997); Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda's Defenders,
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zona.4 Cassell's readers are accustomed to a steady stream of
speculative accusations that Miranda causes tens of thousands of
guilty suspects to escape conviction every year.5 This time, how-
ever, Cassell attacks the constitutionally-based warnings on the
grounds that they harm innocent suspects.6 Not only is Cassell's
thesis that "Miranda affirmatively harms the innocentO unsup-
ported by any evidence, it also flies in the face of reason.
Protecting the Innocent advances three points in particular.
First, Cassell suggests an "alternative" methodology for estimat-
ing the annual frequency of wrongful convictions arising from
false confessions.8 This proposal rests on empirically untenable
assumptions, and it ignores the formidable methodological bar-
riers to estimating the harms of improper police interrogation
methods. Ultimately, Cassell's method for quantifying the fre-
quency of wrongful convictions following from false confessions
amounts to no more than grand speculation masquerading as a
reasoned estimate of fact. Hence, it has no credible empirical
foundation, and it should not be used as the basis for any factu-
ally-informed analysis.
Second, Cassell claims that Miranda warning and waiver re-
quirements "present more risks to the innocent [false confes-
sor] than they would prevent."9 Supposedly, Miranda harms the
innocent because it inhibits police from gaining confessions
from truly guilty suspects that would therefore exonerate inno-
cents who have been wrongfully convicted. As with Cassell's first
position, this claim too has no empirical foundation and should
not be the basis for any policy-makingjurisprudence.
Finally, Cassell speculates that substituting the videotaping
of police interrogation for the Miranda rules would "produce
tens of thousands of truthful confessions that would help pro-
tect the innocent."0 Although space limitations prevent us from
90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1084 (1996); Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Re-
assessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 387 (1996); Paul G. Cassell, The Costs of the Miranda
Mandate: A Lesson in the Dangers of Inflexible, "Prophylactic" Supreme Court Inventions, 28
Asuz. ST. L.J. 299 (1996).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
Cassell, supra note 1, at 552; see also id. at 538-51.
'Id. at 552.
8id. at 513-24.
9 Id. at 502.
'0 Id. at 503.
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fully discussing this claim, Cassell's proposal to scale back the
Miranda warnings-and thereby undermine custodial suspects'
abilities to resist the pressures of interrogation-might actually
increase the number of false confessions police elicit from in-
nocent suspects."
In this commentary, we focus primarily on Cassell's first two
claims. 2 In Part II, we briefly explain why neither social scien-
tists nor legal scholars presently possess the requisite informa-
tion to make empirically sound quantitative estimates of the
annual frequency of false confessions or the number of wrong-
ful convictions they cause. 3 In Part III, we address Cassell's im-
plausible claim that Miranda harms the innocent more than it
helps them. Finally, in Part IV, we argue that Cassell's essay rep-
resents less of an effort to seriously explore optimal ways of pro-
tecting the innocent than a continuation of his scapegoating of
Miranda for many of the real and imagined problems of the
American criminal justice system.14 Cassell's claim that Miranda
harms the innocent not only strains credulity, but also is an un-
helpful diversion from much needed reforms that would im-
prove police investigation practices and protect the innocent
from wrongful conviction.
" For the argument that Miranda neither dispels nor affects the conditions of
modem interrogation that lead to false confession, and therefore Miranda does not
offer any significant protection against the admission of false confessions, see Richard
A. Leo, Miranda and the Problem of False Confessions, in TBE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW,
JuSTcE AND POuIcNG 271, 271-82 (Richard A. Leo & George C. Thomas, II eds.,
1998).
"2 Professor Stephen Schulhofer has already replied to the merits of Cassell's ar-
gument that the Miranda warning and waiver requirements be replaced with video-
taping. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and
Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 500, 556-57 (1996).
"s See also RichardJ. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Social Psychology of Police Interroga-
tion: The Theoy and Classification of True and False Confessions, 16 STuD. L., POi- & Soc'y
189, 191-94 (1997) [hereinafter Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology]; Richard A. Leo &
RichardJ. Ofshe, Missing the Forest for the Trees: A Response to Paul Cassell's "Balanced Ap-
proach" to the False Confession Problem, 74 DENY. U. L. REv. 1135, 1136-39 (1997) [here-
inafter Leo & Ofshe, Missing the Forest].
" Professor Schulhofer has advanced this same criticism against Cassell in another
context. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Bashing Miranda Is Unjustified-And Harmfu 20
HARv. J.L. PUB. POLy 347, 372 (1997) ("All the talk about 'terrible Miranda' is there-
fore worse than just wrong. That kind of talk amounts to picking on a convenient
scapegoat and distracting our attention from the real problem.").
1998] 559
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II. ESTIMATING THE FREQUENCY OF FALSE CONFESSIONS AND
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 5
A. IS QUANTIFICATION POSSIBLE? IS IT NECESSARY? IS A HOUSE-
OF-CARDS REALLY BETTER THAN A HUMBLE "I DON'T KNOW?"
To the extent that Cassell suggests that he is providing an
"alternative" methodology to our procedures for quantifying the
frequency of false confessions his analysis is misleading. 6 We
have never suggested or advocated any particular methodology
for estimating the frequency of false confessions. To the con-
trary, we have repeatedly pointed out that the methodological
problems inherent in arriving at a sound estimate are formida-
ble and unsolved, and we have concluded that no well-founded
estimate has yet been published. 7  Although Cassell is well
aware of our analysis of the barriers to estimating false confes-
sion rates, he suggests no solutions to these fundamental prob-
lems. Instead, he uses our paper (in this volume of The Journal
of Criminal Law and Criminology) as another opportunity to en-
gage in Miranda-bashing.'
There are at least three major reasons why it is not presently
feasible to estimate validly the incidence of police-induced con-
fessions or the number of wrongful convictions they cause.
First, American police typically do not record interrogations in
their entirety. Therefore, it is not possible to ascertain the
ground truth of the interrogation (i.e., what really happened)
or the validity of confession statements with any reasonable de-
gree of certainty. Second, because no criminal justice agency
keeps records or collects statistics on the number or frequency
of interrogations in America, no one knows how often suspects
are interrogated or how often they confess, whether truthfully
or falsely. Third, many, if not most, cases of false confession are
likely to go entirely unreported by the media and therefore un-
acknowledged and unnoticed by researchers.
For these reasons, it is not possible to reach a sound esti-
mate of the incidence of false confession, or to estimate how of-
" This discussion necessarily draws on and repeats an earlier debate we had with
Cassell on this very issue. See Leo & Ofshe, Missing the Forest, supra note 13, at 1135.
6 Cassell, supra note 1, at 513-24.
7 See Leo & Ofshe, Missing the Forest, supra note 13, at 1137-39; Ofshe & Leo, Social
Psychology, supra note 13, at 191.
" SeeLeo & Ofshe, Missing the Forest, supra note 13, at 1135, 1143.
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ten false confessions lead to wrongful convictions. Yet Cassell
criticizes the false confession literature for failing to provide "a
ballpark estimate of the frequency of false confessions," 19 as if
empirical researchers somehow bear this burden. However, one
might view the absence of any such estimates as resulting from
most researchers' preference for an honest "I don't know" to
the use of guesswork to arrive at specious estimates of real world
facts. Until it becomes possible to draw a random sample of
confession cases from a definable universe and accurately de-
termine both the ground truth of the interrogation and the va-
lidity of the confession statement in each case, it will not be
possible to arrive at a methodologically acceptable estimate of
the annual frequency of false confessions or the number of
wrongful convictions they cause.
We reject not only Cassell's assertion that reasonable quan-
tification is presently possible, but also his insistence that this is
somehow necessary to make considered public policy decisions
about the regulation of interrogation methods. ° It is well estab-
lished that psychologically-induced false confessions occur fre-
quently enough to warrant the concern of criminal justice
officials, legislators and the general public.2' Whether or not
Cassell wishes to acknowledge this 2 -- and regardless of the ad-
"Cassell, supra note 1, at 500.
Id. at 500-03, 505-07, 524, 537-38.
21 See Richard A. Leo & RichardJ. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Depri-
vations of Liberty and Miscarriages ofJustice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J.
CiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998) [hereinafter Leo & Ofshe, The Consequences of
False Confessions].
"Cassell tries to minimize the frequency and importance of police-induced false
confession by arguing that "common sense suggests that suspects will more often
'confess' for understandable reasons (such as protecting a loved one) than because
police have somehow convinced them that they actually committed the crime." Cas-
sell, supra note 1, at 519. Curiously, unlike the problem of wrongful conviction from
false confession, which Cassell asserts is an empirical issue that "cannot be resolved by
a priori theoretical reasoning," apparently the social psychology of false confession can
be resolved by a priori reasoning-Cassell's a priori reasoning. See id. at 500. However,
Cassell's sense here is not that common at all, and, in fact, is clearly contradicted by
the empirical research literature on the social psychology of false confessions. SeeLeo
& Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions, supra note 21, at 429-91; RichardJ. Of-
she & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Ac-
tion, 74 DENy. U. L. REv. 979, 1001-106 (1997) [hereinafter, Ofshe & Leo, The Decision
to Confess Falsely]; Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology, supra note 13, at 191.
Cassell further suggests that his "common sense" argument is supported by a sin-
gle study of police-induced versus suspect-induced false confessions among Icelandic
prisoners, and that the Icelandic figure probably overstates the proportion of suspect-
induced confessions in America because of Iceland's inquisitorial legal system. See
1998]
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vocacy numbers2s he conjures up to speculate about the impor-
tance of other issues-police-induced false confessions, and the
miscarriages of justice they spawn, remain serious policy prob-
lems in the American criminal justice system.24
The project of quantification is Cassell's, not ours or any
other researchers studying interrogation and false confessions.
If Cassell were able to solve the methodological problems we
have identified, or if he were able to explain why our methodo-
logical concerns are misplaced, then we would welcome quanti-
fication. If, however, Cassell's quantification scheme is merely a
rhetorical device to permit him to argue for the superiority of
his policy preferences, we must necessarily reject his conclusions
Cassell, supra note 1, at 519. However, Cassell not only ignores the relevant American
research literature on this issue, but also fails to mention that, unlike in America, Ice-
landic interrogators are not legally permitted to employ trickery or deception during
interrogation. Personal Correspondence from Gisli Gudjonsson to Richard Leo (Jan.
19, 1998) (on file with authors). In addition, in Iceland all confessions have to be re-
peated in front of a judge. Id. Thus, there is no reason to believe that the figures
Cassell cites from a single Icelandic study translate at all into a reasonable estimate of
what in fact occurs in America. There are other problems--such as the differences in
the nature and rates of crime, the racial composition of the universe of suspects, and
the cultural attitudes toward authority-that limit the generalizability of the research
in Iceland to the research in America. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
Cassell also suggests that, "other things being equal, it should be easier for the po-
lice to persuade someone to falsely confess to a larceny than to confess to a murder.
The Gudjonsson and Sigurdsson study provides strong support for this hypothesis."
See Cassell, supra note 1, at 523 (citing Gisli H. Gudjonsson &Jon F. Sigurdsson, How
Frequently Do False Confessions Occur?: An Empirical Study Among Prison Inmates, 1
PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 21, 23 (1994)). The problem with Cassell's hypothesis here, of
course, is that all other things are not equal. While in theory it may be easier for po-
lice to elicit false confessions to less serious crimes, in practice they put far more re-
sources, time and effort into eliciting confessions in more serious cases. For this
reason, as well as the methodological problems of comparing American and Icelandic
interrogation practices, Gudjonsson and Sigurdsson's study hardly provides "strong"
support for Cassell's hypothesis here. Moreover, Cassell fails to mention our field re-
search in America, which indicates that the problem of police-induced false confession
occurs disproportionately in more serious cases. See Leo & Ofshe, Missing the Forest,
supra note 13, at 1139-40.
See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Pointing In The Wrong Direction, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 12,
1996, at 21 ("Readers should understand that these are simply advocacy numbers, de-
rived from indefensibly selective accounts of the available data.").
4 It is curious that Cassell characterizes the problem of wrongful conviction from
false confessions as "rare" and "exotic" in light of his own multi-step speculation that
10 to 394 wrongful convictions from false confessions occur yearly. See Cassell, supra
note 1, at 502, 538. If one takes Gassell's quantitative estimates seriously-we do not,
but certainly Cassell does-then in the 32 years since the Supreme Court decided
Miranda v. Arizona, somewhere between 320 and 12,608 individuals have been
wrongly convicted from false confessions alone. If true, this would surely be evidence
that police-induced false confession represents a serious problem in America.
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as ideologically driven and the products of a commitment to the
advocacy of a particular value position rather than to the em-
pirical ascertainment of truth.
Whenever Cassell attempts to give the appearance of quan-
titatively demonstrating the supposedly tragic consequences of
Miranda, he uses a simple and formulaic approach. First, Cas-
sell argues that the existing literature emphasizes one side of
the problem and thus a narrow set of policy solutions.26 He
then proposes that there are really two sides to the problem
and, in an age of finite resources, policy decisions must be made
in light of competing trade-offs.27 Next, Cassell proclaims that
researchers must quantify the dimensions of the problem in or-
der to assess its importance and make informed policy judg-
ments about competing tradeoffs. 28  Cassell then criticizes his
opponents for failing to adhere to his standard.2 He then con-
jures up severely flawed or simplistic estimates of the effects of
the policy alternatives through a series of arcane numerical ma-
nipulations that supposedly measure the costs and benefits of
competing policy proposals on a common metric.3 Finally, Cas-
sell concludes that the social costs of Miranda far outweigh its
benefits, and that it should therefore be overruled."
Though Miranda relies on a series of highly problematic as-
sumptions and extrapolations, Cassell's quantitative analysis
permits him rhetorically to claim to be able to compare other-
wise incommensurable policy trade-offs and then to declare a
clear winner-the abolition of Miranda. The problem with Cas-
sell's impulse to quantification, however, is that it oversimplifies
complicated issues and inevitably presents speculation as fact in
the service of a larger ideological agenda: abolishing Miranda
and promoting of state power in the criminal justice system.
While Cassell attempts to preempt this criticism by approvingly
quoting Professor Schulhofer's statement that the "'size of a le-
gal problem does matter, and we cannot avoid thinking about it,
or rely only on our intuitions, just because a perfect study has
2' See Cassell, supra note 1, at 497-98.
27 Id. at 499.
2






yet to be done,'"12 Cassell fails to mention that elsewhere Schul-
hofer characterizes Cassell's particular extrapolations as "simply
rhetoric," and "not a serious foundation for assessing social pol-
icy.
'3
B. CASE EXAMPLES OF FALSE CONFESSIONS
Prior to explicating his estimation methodology, Cassell ar-
bitrarily eliminates from consideration individuals who have
been wrongfully arrested and/or wrongfully prosecuted based
on false confessions, but not wrongfully convicted." However,
the harms that the criminal justice system inflicts on false con-
fessors are not limited to wrongful incarceration post-
conviction, but also include wrongful (and sometimes lengthy)
pre-trial deprivation of liberty, the stigma associated with crimi-
nal charges, the irrevocable loss of reputation, the stresses of
standing trial and the sometimes bankrupting financial burdens
of defending oneself in costly and drawn out proceedings
against the state. We believe it is therefore appropriate to view
the amount of harm that the system inflicts on innocent indi-
viduals, not merely the fact of their conviction, as the proper
measure of impact in the study of miscarriages of justice. The
amount of harm can thus be treated as a continuous variable,
and its victims can be indexed along a continuum ranging from
wrongful arrest, prosecution and pre-trial deprivation of liberty
to wrongful conviction and incarceration to wrongful execution.
The end category (the execution of the innocent), not the mid-
dle one that Cassell selects (wrongful conviction), is "the ulti-
mate miscarriage ofjustice."
The decision to focus only on those cases that result in
wrongful conviction and post-trial incarceration arbitrarily
minimizes all of Cassell's estimates of the harms of police-
induced false confessions. For example, this decision reduces
Cassell's focus from the sixty cases we report to only those
twenty-nine that resulted in wrongful conviction. Cassell then
"Id- at 501 (quoting Schulhofer, supra note 12, at 505).
Schulhofer, supra note 12, at 546.
See Cassell, supra note 1, at 504-05.
For research on the ultimate miscarriage of justice, see Hugo Adam Bedau &
Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages ofJustice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21
(1987); Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions are Common in
Capital Cases, 44 BuFF. L. REv. 469 (1996).
564 [Vol. 88
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suggests that these twenty-nine cases represent only "a few drops
in this very large bucket" 6 because, according to his extrapola-
tions, -approximately 368,000 homicide interrogations occurred
during the time period of these twenty-nine cases (from 1973 to
1996) .
However, Cassell's decision to treat either our sixty case ex-
amples or the twenty-nine convictions as though they constitute
what we believe to be the entire relevant population of false
confessions resulting in wrongful convictions from 1973 to 1996
is both fallacious and ideology-serving. We were able to investi-
gate only a small fraction of the disputed police interrogations
that occurred in this twenty-three year interval. Cassell's impli-
cation that only twenty-nine wrongful convictions from false
confessions occurred during this time period is therefore mis-
leading.- As we made clear in our article, our descriptive statis-
tics summarize variation in the case outcomes of the set of false
confessions we studiedY. We have no idea what proportion of
the false confessions occurring during this twenty-three year pe-
riod we have discovered.
Cassell attempts to reduce the significance of the false con-
fession problem further by mis-reviewing the import of previous
studies of police interrogation in America and England and
concluding that they represent a "dry well for false confes-
sions."40 For example, it is misleading to hold out Richard Leo's
doctoral dissertation to support the position that false confes-
sion rarely happens since Leo made no effort to study this issue
in that research. The purpose of Leo's observational research
was to study routine interrogation practices, not false confes-
' Cassell, supra note 1, at 507.
37Id. at 506.
"In his critique of Bedau and Radelet's research on miscarriages ofjustice in po-
tentially capital cases, Cassell and his co-author made the same logical error. As Be-
dau and Radelet point out:
When Markman and Cassell calculate from our data that the risk of erroneous
executions approximates the fraction 23/7000, they imply that we believe that
each of the roughly 6977 executions we did not count as miscarriages involved
no innocent defendants. But we made it clear that we had not investigated more
than a few of these 6977 cases and that so far as we knew, no one else had restud-
ied them. It is a fallacy to treat our 23 examples as though they constitute what
we believe to be the entire relevant population.
Bedau & Radelet, supra note 2, at 165 n.30 (citations omitted).
"SeeLeo & Ofshe, The Consequence of False Confessions, sup-a note 21, at 472-91.
40 Cassell, supra note 1, at 509.
1998]
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sions.4 ' Accordingly, Leo never attempted to determine whether
any of the 182 interrogations that he observed led to false con-
fessions. As with Leo's dissertation research, the purpose of the
well-known 1967 Yale Study also was to observe routine interro-
gation practices and evaluate the impact of Miranda in a single
jurisdiction, not to discover instances of false confession. The
fact that neither these post-Miranda impact studies, nor the oth-
ers that Cassell cites,42 study the phenomenon of false confes-
sions simply cannot be construed as support for Cassell's
assumption that false confessions are rare. Cassell's conclusion
that "[t] he frequency of false confessions in America appears to
be so low as to have escaped detection in the various samples
that have been drawn, 43 is therefore unjustified.
In his effort to negate the claim that wrongful convictions
from false confessions are common, Cassell also mentions Dr.
Gisli Gudjonsson, who is widely recognized as one of the leading
authorities on false confessions44 and whose primary research in
the last decade and a half has focused on interrogation and con-
fession in England and Iceland.45 However, it is surprising to
cite Gudjonsson's research for the proposition that false confes-
sions rarely occur, since Gudjonsson himself generally makes
the opposite point: that false confessions occur more frequently
4' Though Leo did not analyze whether any of the 182 interrogations produced
false confessions, he did review the literature on false confessions and, contrary to
Cassell's implications, concluded that: "In both England and America, researchers
have uncovered numerous documented cases of false confessions to police, many of
which subsequently resulted in wrongful convictions and lengthy prison sentences."
Richard A. Leo, Police Interrogation in America: A Study of Violence, Civility and So-
cial Change 383 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley)
(on file with authors).
42 See Lawrence S. Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado: The Implementation of
Miranda, 47 DENV. U. L. REv. 1 (1970); RichardJ. Medalie et al., Custodial Police Inter-
rogation in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REV.
1347 (1968); Richard H. Seeburger & R. Stanton Wettick, Jr., Miranda in Pittsburgh-
A Statistical Study, 29 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1967);James W. Witt, Non-Coercive Interrogation
and the Administration of Criminal Justice: The Impact of Miranda on Police Effectuality, 64J.
CiM. L. & CRINoLoGY320 (1973).
13 Cassell, supra note 1, at 513.
" See, e.g., RICHARD FIRSTMAN & JAMIE TALAN, THE DEATH OF INNOCENTS: A TRUE
STORY OF MURDER, MEDICINE, AND HIGH-STAKES SCIENCE 477 (1997) ("An Icelandic-
born psychologist who had once been a police detective in Reykjavik, [Gudjonsson]
was probably the world's leading expert in interrogations and confessions, with a spe-
cial emphasis on false confessions").
See generally GISu H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS,
CONFESSIONS AND TESTMONY (1992).
[Vol. 88
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than most people believe. In his treatise on the psychology of
interrogation and confession, Gudjonsson devotes three full
chapters to the problem of false confession and miscarriages of
justice,47 describes numerous documented cases of false confes-
48sion, and concludes that, "[f]alse confessions, which most
commonly result from psychological coercion during police in-
terrogation, are known to be the cause of wrongful conviction
in a sizeable proportion of all cases where miscarriages ofjustice
have occurred."49
However, Cassell does not substantively discuss Dr. Gudjons-
son's seminal book in the main text of his article. Instead, he
focuses on three studies of Icelandic prisoners by Gudjonsson
and his colleagues.0 Cassell reports how often these prisoners
claimed to have falsely confessed to the crimes for which they
were incarcerated, but he relegates to a footnote the more im-
portant issue of how often they claimed to have made false con-
fessions.5 1 Twelve percent (N=27) of the Icelandic prisoners
interviewed in Sigurdsson and Gudjonsson's 1994 study re-
ported having in the past made a false confession. In addition,
Sigurdsson and Gudjonsson cite an earlier English study of ju-
"' As Gudjonsson observed:
It seems that many people believe that innocent individuals would never confess
to a serious crime during police interrogation, when it is so blatantly against their
self-interest. The implicit assumption is that people always act in a self-serving
way. In reality this is often not the case.... The sad fact is that some people who
are not obviously mentally ill or handicapped do confess falsely to serious crimes
and are consequently wrongfully convicted. Greater awareness of this is an im-
portant step forward in achieving justice.
Id. at 234.
"' Id at 205-73 (covering Ch. 10 ("The Psychology of False Confession: Research
and Theoretical Issues"), Ch. 11 ("The Psychology of False Confession: Case Exam-
ples"), and Ch. 12 ("The Guildford Four and the Birmingham Six")).
48 Id. at 234-73.
49 Id. at 232.
' SeeJon F. Sigurdsson & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychological Characteristics of
"False Confessors": A Study Among Icelandic Prison Inmates and Juvenile Offenders, 20
PERSON. & INDIV. DFERENCES 321 (1996); Gisli H. Gudjonsson &Jon F. Sigurdsson,
How Frequently Do False Confessions Occur?: An Empirical Study Among Prison Inmates, 1
PSYCHOL. Cm & L. 21 (1994); Gisli H. Gudjonsson & Hannes Petursson, Custodial
Interrogation: Why Do Suspects Confess and How Does it Relate to Their Crime, Attitude and
Personality?, 12 PERSON. & INDiv. DIFFERENCES 295 (1991).
", See Cassell, supra note 1, at 511 nn.64-65. The first study that Cassell cites is not
about false confessions, and therefore we do not discuss it in the text. See Gudjonsson
& Petursson, supra note 50.
" Gudjonsson & Sigurdsson, supra note 50, at 21.
1998]
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veniles in which 23% (N=60) of those interviewed reported hav-
ing made a false confession to police. 3 In Gudjonsson and
Sigurdsson's more recent study, once again 12% (N=62) of the
Icelandic prisoners interviewed reported making a false confes-
sion to police some time in their lives.
5 4
Contrary to Cassell's reading of Gudjonsson's research, the
empirical record does not cast doubt on the likely occurrence of
false confessions. Moreover, Cassell fails to mention the condi-
tions that limit the generalizability of Gudjonsson's research on
Icelandic and English interrogation practices to contemporary
American interrogation practices. Unlike their American coun-
terparts, Icelandic and English police are not permitted to trick
or deceive their suspects.55 This difference is extremely impor-
tant because our field research identifies the tactic of creating a
sense of hopelessness by overstating or inventing evidence-
which is not available to Icelandic or English interrogators-as
one of the major causes of police-induced false confessions in
America. 6
" Graeme Richardson, A Study of Interrogative Suggestibility in an Adolescent Fo-
rensic Population (1991) (unpublished M.Sc. Thesis, Univ. of Newcastle Upon Tyne)
(cited in Gudjonsson & Sigurdsson, supra note 50, at 22).
-" Sigurdsson & Gudjonsson, supra note 50, at 321. See alsoJon F. Sigurdsson &
Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Relationship Between Types of Claimed False Confession Made and
the Reasons Why Suspects Confess to the Police According to the Gudonsson Confession Ques-
tionnaire (GCQ), 1 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL 259 (1996);Jon F. Sigurdsson &
Gisli H. Gudjonsson, Illicit Drug Use Among "False Confessors": A Study Among Icelandic
Prison Inmates, 50 NORDICJ. PSYcHOL 325, 326 (1996).
'- There are other important differences-such as the nature and rates of crime,
the racial composition of the universe of suspects, and the cultural attitudes toward
authority-that Cassell does not mention. Criticizing Cassell for his one-sided use of
comparisons to Great Britain and Canada in another context, George Thomas writes
that,
[c] omparative data is useful only when the jurisdictions share a core of relevant
characteristics. The United States has a much higher crime rate than either Brit-
ain or Canada, with a disproportionate part of the difference in violent crime; we
train and arm our police officers differently; we have a much more skeptical atti-
tude toward authority in general and the police in particular. Any comparison of
our interrogation with that in Britain and Canada cannot be accepted until these
differences are quantified and explained.
See George C. Thomas, III, Plain Talk About The Miranda Empirical Debate: A "Steady-
State" Theory of Confessions, 43 UCLA L REv. 933, 942-43 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
What Thomas writes about Canada is also true of Iceland, thus rendering Cassell's
generalizations from interrogation and confession in Iceland to the American context
equally problematic. See supra note 22.
'6 See Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology, supra note 13, at 200-03; Ofshe & Leo, The Deci-
sion to Confess Falsely, supra note 22, at 989-90.
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C. ESTIMATING ERROR RATES BYAGGREGATING IGNORANCE
The problem with Cassell's approach to estimating the rate
of wrongful conviction from false confessions is easily recogniz-
able to anyone familiar with the intellectual game of computer
model building and computer simulation. When a great deal of
data is available about the operations of a complex system,
computer simulations of the system's behavior can be helpful
and reveal properties that are not immediately obvious. How-
ever, as the amount of reliable information declines and more
assumptions have to be added to fill gaps in actual knowledge,
the entire enterprise becomes questionable because the system's
predictions become determined by the assumptions that were
introduced in the beginning. In the end, the model turns out
to be nothing more than a structure that transmutes an initial
assumption into a consequent of the analysis.
Cassell's numerical estimate of the harms of Miranda illus-
trates this problem because his conclusions all depend on noth-
ing but speculation about the annual rate of criminal justice
system error. Cassell arrives at his estimate of wrongful convic-
tions from false confessions by multiplying the number of an-
nual convictions (variable number 1) by the error rate in the
criminal justice system (variable number 2) by the proportion of
errors attributable to false confessions (variable number 3) .5
The fatal flaw in this calculation, however, is that no one
knows-or even has a reasonably good idea of-the error rate in
the system (variable number 2). Because there are no valid es-
timates of the rate of system error to be found anywhere in the
literature on miscarriages of justice, all of Cassell's extrapola-
tions are utterly speculative. In the end, Cassell's estimates can
never be any better than the assumptions he makes about this
error term.
Cassell attempts to maneuver around this glaring problem
by drawing upper-end and lower-end estimates of the error rate
in the system from the work of Ronald Huff and his colleagues.-
The upper-end estimate upon which Cassell draws puts the rate
of system error at .05% (I out of every 200 convictions). How-
'7 Cassell, supra note 1, at 513-18.
See C. RONALD HUFF ET AL., CoNvIcrED BUT INNOCENT. WRONGFUL CONVICTION
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1996); C. Ronald Huff et al., Guilty Until Proved Innocent: Wrongful
Conviction and Public Policy, 32 ClIME & DEuNQ. 518 (1986).
1998] 569
LEO & OFSHE
ever, this estimate is nothing more than the collective speculation
of some criminal justice officials in Ohio and some state attor-
ney generals: it has absolutely no basis in observation or fact. Huff et
al. arrived at this figure by asking 55 Ohio county judges, 53
prosecutors, 21 public defenders, 59 sheriffs and chiefs of po-
lice, and 41 state attorney generals to guess into which of four
categories the error rate in the system most likely fell ("never,"
"less than 1%," "1-5%," and "6-10%"). Huff et al. then arbitrar-
ily assigned the final number as the mid-point between the two
most frequently chosen categories-"never" and "less than
1%."59 Because this estimate is based on the aggregated igno-
rance of some criminal justice officials, it is empirically worthless
as a valid measure of the true error rate in the criminal justice
system. °
Even more remarkably, Cassell bases his lower-end estimate
of the error rate in the entire American criminal justice system
on the opinion of one Ohio county judge, who responded to
the Huff et al. survey by stating that he has "a strong suspicion
that each year in Ohio, at least one or two dozen persons are
convicted of crimes of which they are innocent."6 1 From this
single statement, Cassell extrapolates a system error rate of
.035%,62 which he then calls a "reasonable estimate. " 63 This
method of estimating a real world phenomenon is patently ab-
surd. Cassell's willingness to base his policy analysis and rec-
ommendations for profound changes in the societal regulation
of police interrogation on such flimsy guesswork lends support
to Professor Schulhofer's observation that Cassell's extrapola-
tions are often "simply rhetoric,"6 and "not a serious foundation
'9 We wonder how Huff et al. found it possible to average "never" and "less than
1%," since "never' suggests an infinity that goes beyond a mere zero observations. It
is also striking that so many of these criminal justice officials apparently believe that
miscarriages ofjustice never occur in the state of Ohio.
" While this figure (if based on a representative sample and properly averaged
out) might be useful as a measure of what some Ohio county criminal justice officials
and state attorney generals perceive to be the rate of system error in their states, these
aggregated speculations do not represent either a valid or reliable measure of the
real-world error rate in the criminal justice system.
6, HUFF Er AL., supra note 58, at 522. Cassell does not mention that although Huff
et al. quote this judge in a short 1986 article on wrongful convictions, they do not re-
produce the quote in their 1996 book on the topic.
62 Cassell, supra note 1, at 518.
Id. at 517.
6 4 Schulhofer, supra note 12, at 546.
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for assessing social policy." 6s Relying on the collective specula-
ions found in the Huff et al. study to estimate the error rate in
the American criminal justice system makes about as much
sense as relying on biblical writings to estimate the age of the
earth.6
III. DOES MIRANA HARM THE INNOCENT?
Cassell has advanced a plainly counter-intuitive and entirely
speculative argument: that "Miranda has harmed innumerable
innocents by preventing the police from obtaining confessions
from the actual perpetrators of crimes ... ,67 The typical con-
servative attack on Miranda is that it protects the guilty from
apprehension and punishment. We know of no other person
who has ever argued that Miranda affirmatively harms innocent
individuals who may later become custodial suspects or that it
affirmatively prevents the exoneration and release of innocent
individuals who have been wrongfully convicted and incarcer-
ated. If Cassell's argument is correct, then he has turned con-
ventional legal wisdom on its head by showing that Miranda not
only frustrates the imperatives of crime control, but also that it
frustrates the imperatives of due process.9
But is Cassell's argument correct?
According to Cassell, there are two scenarios that describe
how Miranda harms the innocent.7 Under the first, Cassell's
frustrated detective scenario, a guilty criminal suspect, who can be
arrested only if he confesses, fails to do so, but instead invokes
'Id.
Cassell was criticized for this speculation when he presented it to a symposium
on coercion, exploitation and the law at the University of Denver Law School in
March, 1997. One participant wrote to Cassell: "As you know, I believe that your ef-
fort to estimate the maximum number of wrongful convictions produced by false con-
fessions on the basis of one judge's wild guess of the minimum number of such
convictions in Ohio is bizarre." Letter from Albert Alschuler to Paul Cassell (Aug. 29,
1997) (on file with authors).
67 Cassell, supra note 1, at 503.
6' See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
" For a review of the crime control and due process models, see HERBERT L.
PACKER, THE LIMITs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149-73 (1968). If Cassell's argument
is correct, one might argue that Miranda not only fails to instantiate the values of the
Fifth Amendment inside the interrogation room, but also that Miranda is at war with
the Constitution.
70 Cassell, supra note 1, at 524-38.
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one of his Miranda rights and escapes arrest.7 Cassell supposes
that in the absence of a rule requiring police to issue Miranda
warnings to custodial suspects, the guilty party would not have
refused to confess and would have been arrested and convicted.
In the frustrated detective scenario, having failed to obtain a confes-
sion from the truly guilty party, the detective goes on and inter-
rogates some conveniently available innocent suspect. The
innocent not only waives Miranda, but thereafter gives a false
confession. The innocent is then wrongly convicted.72
Cassell's vision of police conduct here seems highly un-
likely, and more bizarre than anything likely to be voiced seri-
ously even at a conference of the criminal defense bar. Why
would police, having correctly identified a perpetrator (pre-
sumably because solid evidence points to him), but having
failed to successfully interrogate him, go on to extract a confes-
sion from an innocent, much less even interrogate him? This
makes little sense. While our research indicates that false con-
fessions are caused by police incompetence, negligence and dis-
regard of prohibitions against the use of coercion, we have
never seen a case in which police choose to give up their pursuit
of a strong suspect and interrogate an innocent suspect merely
because they have been foiled by a Miranda invocation.73 In our
experience, a Miranda invocation tends to increase, rather than
decrease, police interest in a suspect.
In Cassell's second scenario, the ever-diligent detective scenario,
an innocent person has already been wrongfully convicted and
imprisoned. 74 Despite the fact that the police, as the investiga-
tive arm of the state, gathered the evidence supporting the con-
viction, they strangely keep their investigation open and
eventually go on to interrogate the guilty suspect, who can be
found out only if he confesses. Instead, however, the guilty sus-
pect decides to invoke one of his Miranda rights and refuses to
cooperate with his interrogators. In the absence of a rule re-
quiring police to issue Miranda warnings to custodial suspects,
Cassell supposes that the guilty suspect would have confessed
71 Id.
72 id
7' See generally Leo & Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions, supra note 21; Of-
she & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 22; Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology,
supra note 13.
7' Cassell, supra note 1, at 524-38.
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and eventually been convicted." But, because Miranda pre-
vented police from obtaining a confession from the guilty party,
the imprisoned innocent is neither exonerated nor released.76
The ever-diligent detective scenario also is unsupported by
logic or empirical evidence and thus remains highly unlikely, if
not completely implausible. The fatal flaw in Cassell's ever-
diligent detective scenario is the assumption that police generally
keep open cases in which their investigations have already pro-
duced a confession and a conviction. This assumption is not
only contrary to police practice, but is also completely unsup-
ported by any of the data we have gathered in our study of po-
lice-induced false confessions 7 or, for that matter, by any of the
research literature on false confessions and miscarriages of jus-
tice. While reliable confessions from the true perpetrator are
among the leading sources of exoneration of the wrongfully
convicted, police virtually always acquire such confessions acci-
dentally or unintentionally.78 Sometimes-as in the cases of the
Phoenix Temple Four,7 Johnny Lee Wilson, and Melvin Lee
Reynolds, 81 for example-the very police who coerced a false
confession from an innocent suspect do everything in their




, Id. Cassell points out that in Sam Gross's study of eyewitness misidentifications,
54% of the exonerations occurred after the guilty party confessed, and that in Arye
Rattner's study of wrongful convictions, over 40% of the exonerations occurred after
the guilty party confessed. See i& at 531. Cassell fails to mention that in the recent
study of wrongful convictions by Edward Connors and his colleagues-which Cassell,
approvingly citing Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld, seems to regard as "generally rep-
resentative"-0% of the wrongfully convicted and incarcerated innocents were exon-
erated by a confession. Absent the rise of DNA technology, it is likely that all of these
innocents would have continued to languish in prison under long sentences. See
EDWARD CONNORS ET AL, CoNvIcrED BYJURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES
IN THE USE OF DNA EvIDENE TO ESTABmSH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 34-76 (1996). Of
course, since none of these three studies were (or could have been) based on random
samples, it is problematic to generalize their findings to other populations.
"' Leo & Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions, supra note 21.
78Id. at 474.
7
9See Russ Kimball & Laura Greenberg, Trials and Tribulations, PHOENIX MAG., Dec.
1993, at 101; Russ Kimball & Laura Greenberg, False Confessions, PHOENIX MAG., Nov.
1993, at 85; Russ Kimball & Laura Greenberg, Revelations From the Temple PHOENIX
MAG., Oct. 1993, at 83.
" See Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology, supra note 13, at 222-26; Joseph P. Shapiro, In-
nocent, But Behind Bars, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 19, 1994, at 36.




In sum, both of Cassell's scenarios are so highly implausible
as to seem fanciful. Instead of marshalling any empirical evi-
dence that might bear on the phenomenon of false confessions,
Cassell relies on a series of questionable assumptions and tenu-
ous extrapolations to further his argument that Miranda-con-
trary to its intent, logic and appearance-somehow endangers
the innocent.
IV. CONCLUSION: SCAPEGOATING MRANDA
What, then, are we to make of Cassell's conclusions about
the competing risks to the innocent from false confessions and
lost confessions? Does anyone seriously believe that Miranda
prevents "tens of thousands"8 2 of criminals from being convicted
every year? Or that Miranda actually harms the very innocents
whom it empowers to resist and/or terminate stationhouse in-
terrogation?
Whether or not Cassell fully believes in the validity and reli-
ability of his statistical manipulations, resort to quick and dirty
quantification offers him a unique rhetorical strategy in the pol-
icy debate about Miranda's future. By casting his argument in
quantitative terms-no matter how flawed his assumptions, and
no matter how contrived his reasoning-Cassell eschews the
doctrinal arguments traditionally necessary to argue before legal
scholars that a Supreme Court decision-one of the most fa-
mous and influential Supreme Court decisions, no less-should
be overturned. Cassell also cloaks his attack on Miranda in a
language and style of analysis with which most legal scholars are
wholly unprepared to engage, and may even impress readers
who have no familiarity with social science research methods.
Moreover, Cassell's willingness to engage in crude quantifi-
cation offers him a rhetorical opportunity to pitch his "estima-
tion methodology" and numerical conclusions as providing the
82 See Cassell, supra note 1, at 503, 555. Cassell's quantitative estimates of Mirandas
harms can be a moving target. As Schulhofer observes,
Just a few months ago, in his Northwestern University Law Review article, Professor
Cassell claimed that each year, because of Miranda, an additional 28,000 violent
criminals are walking the streets. By the time he wrote for Legal Times [July 22,
1996], the number had grown to 100,000. Readers should understand that these
are simply advocacy numbers, derived from indefensibly selective accounts of the
available data.
Schulhofer, supra note 23, at 21.
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most reasonable empirical basis for public policy regulating in-
terrogation. Positing that the problem of wrongful conviction
from false confessions "is an empirical or numbers issue that
cannot be resolved by a priori, theoretical reasoning,"" Cassell
criticizes actual empirical research of others such as ourselves
for "reason[ing] solely from anecdotal example,"" and then
concludes that "[flor public policy purposes, the anecdotal evi-
dence collected by Leo and Ofshe tells us little.""' Like the em-
peror who wears no clothes, however, Cassell's argument here is
based solely on illusion. Cassell makes empty claims about a su-
perior "estimation methodology" and advocates only a dark vi-
sion about the possible disastrous consequences of Miranda.
But Cassell might as well admit that his analysis is a priori reason-
ing because it is not based on data that reveals anything about
the actual workings of the criminal justice system. Cassell's try
at quantification eschews original data altogether and instead
relies on assumptions and extrapolations that, masquerading as
sound estimates of a real world phenomenon, ultimately
amount to no more than elaborate speculation.
There is a danger, however, in treating speculation as a rea-
sonable estimate of fact, especially when the speculation may
have fateful consequences for human lives. There is also a dan-
ger in bashing Miranda when it diverts our attention from the
real problems of the criminal justice system-such as the wrong-
ful conviction of the innocent-and the possible solutions to
those problems. Unless and until Professor Cassell can marshal
some compelling data demonstrating Miranda's allegedly tragic
consequences for the innocent, we must continue to presume
that Miranda is a procedural safeguard for, not a procedural
detriment to, the innocent.
If Cassell's primary goal is to bash Miranda, then it is easy to
understand why he has relied on quantitative guesswork to ar-
gue now that Miranda harms the innocent more than it helps
them. This argument appears to be rooted in Cassell's long-
standing contempt for Miranda and offers him yet another rhe-
torical weapon in his highly charged anti-Miranda crusade. 5
Cassell, supra note 1, at 500.
84 I at 500.
Id. at 505.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also Paul Cassell, How Many Criminals
Has Miranda Set Free?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 1995, at A17; Paul Cassell, True Confessions
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Not only does Miranda prevent tens of thousands of lost confes-
sions, lost clearances and lost convictions every year-as Cassell
has repeatedly suggested in the past-but now it can also be said
to hurt the very innocent whom it otherwise seems to help resist
coercive police interrogation. For everyone involved then,
Miranda is, according to Cassell, a social fraud: it produces no
social benefits, it creates only victims. It must be overturned or
else more innocents will be harmed. This newfound discovery--
surprisingly unnoticed by anyone else in more than three dec-
ades of voluminous popular and academic writing on Miranda-
would, if true, seem to offer anti-Miranda critics like Cassell yet
another point of attack in any policy debate about Miranda's le-
gitimacy.
However, if Cassell's primary goal is indeed to protect the
innocent, then his emphasis on overturning Miranda is entirely
misplaced. Instead, a proper reading of the miscarriage of jus-
tice literature would suggest that Cassell should redirect his en-
ergies to the advocacy of tougher safeguards to protect custodial
suspects and criminal defendants-not only against police-
induced false confession, but also against other prominent
sources of wrongful conviction such as eyewitness misidentifica-
tion, 7 the prosecutorial withholding of exculpatory evidence,"8
the use of perjured testimony by so-calledjailhouse informants, 9
About Miranda's Legitimacy, LEGAL TIMES, July 22, 1996, at 20; Paul Cassell, Tossing Out
the Law on Confessions, LEGAL TIME, Apr. 24, 1995, at 26; Paul Cassell &Joseph Grano,
A Federal Statute That Overrules Miranda: A New Argument for Federal Prosecutors in Confes-
sions Cases, 2 CrM. PRAc. L. REP., Sept. 1994, at 147; Paul Cassell & Stephen J. Mark-
man, Miranda's Hidden Costs, NAT'L REV., Dec. 25, 1995, at 30.
In addition to his articles attacking the legitimacy of Miranda, Cassell has sup-
ported and participated in litigation that seeks to overthrow Miranda. See Cassell, su-
pra note 1, at 552 n.288; see, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Washington Legal Foundation
and the Allied Educational Foundation in Support of Respondent, Davis v. United
States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (No. 92-1949) (Cassell as Counsel of Record); Brief of
Amici Curiae Washington Legal Foundation and Safe Streets Coalition, United States
v. Leong, 116 F.3d 1474 (4th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-4876) (same); Brief of Amici Curiae
Washington Legal Foundation et al., United States v. Sullivan (4th Cir. 1997) (No. 97-
4017) (same).
87 See generally BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE
EyEwrrNESs, PSYCHOLOGYAND THE LAw (1995).
88 See HUFF ET AL, supra note 58, at 70-73; MARTIN YANT, PRESUMED GUILTY: WHEN
INNOCENT PEOPLE ARE WRONGLY CONVICTED 135-57 (1991); EDWARD D. RADIN, THE
INNOCENTS 35-53 (1964).
89 See REPORT OF THE 1989-90 Los ANGELES COUNTY GRAND JURY, INVESTIGATION OF
THE INVOLVEMENT OF JAIL HOUSE INFORMANTS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN Los
ANGELES COUNTY (JUNE 26, 1990); Mark Curriden, No Honor Among Thieves, 75 A.BA.
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and ineffective assistance of counsel."° For it is these kinds of
abuses-not the constitutionally-based Miranda warnings-that
lead to miscarriages ofjustice in the first place and that prevent
the exoneration of the wrongfully convicted and incarcerated.9
J. 52 (1989); Clifford S. Zimmerman, Toward A New Vision of Informants: A History of
Abuses and SuggestionsfoReforn, 22 HAsrINGS CONST. L.Q. 81 (1994).
9 See HUFF ET AL., supra note 58, at 76-77; see alsoJoelJay Finer, Ineffective Assistance
of Counse4 58 CoRNE LL. REV. 1077 (1973).
9'This point is amply documented in the research literature on miscarriages ofjus-
tice. See generally HUFF ET AL., supra note 58; YANT, supra note 88; RADIN, supra note 88;
JEROME FRANK & BARBARA FRANK, NOT GumiY (1957); EDwIN M. BORcHARD,
CONVICTING THE INNocENT: SImY-Fiv AcTuAL ERRORs OF CRIMINAL JUSICE (1932);
Bedau & Radelet, supra note 35.
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